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Public Financing of Elections after  
Citizens United and Arizona Free Enterprise  
 
An Analysis of Six Midwestern States  
Based on the Elections of 2006-2010 
  
 
 
 
 
For some time, the Campaign Finance Institute has been arguing the need for a new path 
in campaign finance policy – one that responds effectively to the some of the key 
challenges of recent court decisions within a framework that can withstand constitutional 
challenge.  The bulk of the money spent on politics in the United States comes from a 
small number of people who can afford to give and spend large amounts.  This is not 
surprising.  It takes money to give money, but the problem with this fact in a democracy 
is that it produces unequal political power.  Campaign finance reformers have tried to 
address this in the past by putting limits on contributions and spending.  But the Supreme 
Court has cut off this approach.  The Court has upheld contribution limits only for the 
purpose of preventing corruption, and has rejected any mandatory limits on spending at 
all, including independent spending by corporations.  
 
Restrictions on speech simply will not be accepted in the name of equality, or even in the 
name of a broad definition of “corruption”.  But this does not rule out participation as a 
legitimate concern of public policy.  The requirement is to use policy methods do not 
restrict or inhibit speech.  It is both constitutional and perfectly appropriate to promote 
participation by building up instead of squeezing down – to dilute the power of the few 
by increasing the number and importance of low-dollar donors and volunteers.   
 
The constitutional theory is straightforward.  The empirical question is whether this 
would actually work?   The answer is yes.  This report will use recent contribution 
records from the six Midwestern Great Lakes states to show that a participation-centered 
policy could make a dramatic difference.  The Midwestern information in this report is 
new.  The findings confirm the path taken in Reform in an Age of Networked Campaigns: 
How to Foster Citizen Participation through Small Donors and Volunteers – a report 
published jointly in 2010 by The Campaign Finance Institute, Brookings Institution and 
American Enterprise Institute.1 
 
A few words of caution about what the report does and does not claim. The report is not a 
stand-alone argument in favor of partial public financing of elections, nor does it see 
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small-donor matching funds as the magic wand for all governmental problems. It claims 
that one constitutionally permissible form of public financing, small-donor matching 
funds, will improve participation – changing the sources of candidate funding by altering 
the incentives for both candidates and donors.  Improving participation in turn will be 
good for representative government.  This argument is developed more fully in the multi-
year CFI project of which this report is a part.  
 
 
Summary of Findings 
 
Here is what our analysis of the Midwestern states shows:  
 
• In four of the six states (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Ohio), big money 
dominated. Most of the money raised by candidates for governor and state 
legislature comes from donors who gave $1,000 or more, or from non-party 
organizations (including political action committees).*  In Wisconsin, these two 
large-money sources were somewhat less important but still accounted for more 
than 40 percent of the money.  Only in Minnesota did a majority of the money 
come from donors who gave $250 or less.  
 
• Minnesota’s candidates received 57% of the funds from small donors who gave 
$250 or less (44% from those who gave $100 or less).  The percentages were 
about the same in 2006 (when 60% came from donors of $250 or less), as they 
were in all of the Midwestern states with elections in both years.   
o Minnesota has a big lead over the state with the second highest percentage in 
the nation. While CFI has not completed its 2010 analysis for all 50 states, in 
2006 Minnesota was 20 points ahead of second-place Vermont. (Vermont’s 
candidates raised 40% of their funds from donors who gave $1-$250.)  
o Wisconsin was third in 2006 with 36% and was at 34% in 2010.   
o The other four states were between 3% and 12% in 2006-2010.  
 
• Campaign finance law seems to be an important part of the explanation for these 
results – specifically Minnesota’s and Wisconsin’s contribution limits, as well as 
Minnesota’s partial public financing system.    
 
• But lowering the other states’ contribution limits to the national median would not 
do much by itself to alter this picture.  Lower contribution limits can serve other 
important purposes, but would have only a modest impact on the proportional role 
of large versus small donors.   
 
                                                 
* Note: Our tables treat contributions from the Republican Governors’ Association and Democratic 
Governors’ Association as non-party contributions.  Others may prefer to call these party organizations.  
This question does not affect the percentage from low-dollar individual donors. 
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• In contrast, providing a public matching fund incentive for small donors would 
make a huge difference.  
 
o We ran hypothetical scenarios testing a variety of policy proposals in each 
of these states.  In one scenario, we imagined a low-donor matching fund 
system in which public funds matched the first $50 from every individual 
donor on a five-for-one basis.  This is patterned after New York City, 
which offers a six-for-one match for the first $175.   
 
o This low-donor matching fund system would have a substantial effect in 
all five of the states, even if no more people gave than do now. (Minnesota 
was excluded from this part of the analysis because it already has a 
functioning public financing system.) 
 
o If the system brought more small donors into the system, as we expect, the 
effects would be dramatic. Every state’s numbers would look like 
Minnesota’s. 
 
• For Minnesota, we asked what would happen if the current flat grant system were 
replaced by a matching fund system.  We put this question forward because we 
foresee potential problems with sustaining the current system, as explained later.  
We found that with a small-donor matching fund system, candidates could raise 
more money to respond to self-financed opponents and independent spending, 
while the state would continue to rank first place for the role of its small donors. 
 
 
What Is the Law, and Where Does the Money Come From Now? 
  
Before we begin talking about “what if,” let us take a closer look at “what is”.  This 
section presents bar charts showing where the money comes from in each of the six 
states, together with a brief summary of the provisions of campaign finance law most 
relevant to the role of small and large donors. We focus on the most recent elections in 
which gubernatorial and legislative candidates were all running – 2010 for five of the six 
states and 2008 for Indiana. The states whose candidates received the smallest percentage 
of their money from small donors will be first, followed in order up to the one with the 
highest percentage.   Thus, Illinois will be first, followed by Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, 
Wisconsin and Minnesota.   
 
A few words about the charts first:   
 
• Because we were interested in the mix of donors to candidates, all charts in this 
section leave out self-financing and public funds.   
 
• The charts also present only the money raised by major party general election 
candidates over the course of the a  full two-year election cycle.   
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• The charts present donors not contributions, unlike the typical chart shown on 
state or federal disclosure websites.  This is the only approach that makes sense 
for our purposes.  Candidates care about who gives them how much, not how 
many different checks it takes them to reach the total.  That is why contribution 
limits restrict the total amount a donor may give to a candidate.  A limit per 
contribution would make no sense if it allowed the donor to write an unlimited 
number of checks.  To arrive at the information for donors, as opposed to 
contributions, involves the following steps.  We begin by looking at contribution 
records for all fifty states provided by the National Institute of Money in State 
Politics.  Contributions are identified as coming from the same donor by matching 
the names on contribution records (and indisputable variations of the name) as 
well as considering their addresses.  A donor is classified as giving a certain 
amount to a candidate if all of his/her combined contributions to that candidate 
add up to the amount indicated.   Of course, this means that a person who gives 
$100 or less to a particular candidate may not always be a “small donor”.  The 
same donor could contribute to more than one candidate and fall into different 
ranges for the different candidates.   
 
Three baseline numbers will help put the charts for the six states into perspective. 
 
• Small donors in the Midwest compared to the national median:  We mentioned 
earlier that the most recent elections for which we have analyzed all fifty states 
were the elections of 2006 and 2008.  Of them, 2006 is a better comparison 
because of the four-year gubernatorial election cycle.  In 2006, the median state 
for low-dollar donors was Tennessee: 8% of the money raised by its candidates 
for governor or state legislature came from donors who gave $1-$100 and another 
9% from those who gave $101-$250.   
 
• Contribution limits in the median state:  During the entire period, the median 
contribution limit for individuals (for states with limits) was $4,000 per election 
cycle for contributions to gubernatorial candidates and $2,000 per election cycle 
for contributions to candidates running for the state Assembly or House of 
Representatives. 
 
• Percentage contributing:  Later in this report, we talk about the percentage of 
people who contribute money to campaigns. In 2006, only about 1.5% of the 
Voting Age Population in the median state contributed anything at all to a 
candidate for state legislature or governor.  The number exceeded 4% only in 
Minnesota (4.1%), Vermont (4.7%), New Mexico (4.7%) and Rhode Island 
(5.4%).  
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Illinois 
 
The Illinois campaign finance 
law that was in effect through 
2010 is simple to describe.  Until 
then, Illinois was one of only a 
handful of states with no limits 
on contributions from individual, 
parties or other organizations 
(including direct contributions 
from corporations and labor 
unions).* It should be no surprise 
therefore that the bulk of state 
candidates' money in 2010 came 
from large, organizational 
donors. Gubernatorial and 
legislative candidates raised only 
3% of their private contributions from donors who gave them $150 or less, and only 
another 1% from those who gave $151-$250. (Because Illinois has a $150 disclosure 
threshold, we cannot separate out contributions of $1-100). In contrast, the candidates 
received 13% from individuals who gave $1,000 or more, 30% from political parties and 
50% from interest groups or non-party organizations (including direct corporate and labor 
contributions, which were legal in Illinois at the time, as well as the Republican and 
Democratic Governors’ Associations.) 
 
 
Indiana 
 
Indiana also permits unlimited 
contributions from individuals 
and PACs (but not directly from 
corporations or unions). In the 
election year of 2008, legislative 
and gubernatorial candidates 
received 3% of their money from 
$1-$100 donors and 1% from 
those who gave $101-$250 – 
roughly the same percentages as 
Illinois.  Indiana candidates 
received more of their money 
than their counterparts in Illinois 
from individuals who gave $1,000 or more (25% versus 13%), but less from the parties 
                                                 
* A new law election taking effect in Illinois after the 2010 election limits individual contributions to 
$5,000 per election cycle, PACs to $50,000 and other nonparty organizations to $10,000.   
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(19% versus 30%).  The role of non-party organizations was more or less equivalent 
(46% in Indiana versus 50% in Illinois). 
 
 
Ohio 
In Ohio, individuals and PACs 
in 2009-2010 each were allowed 
to give up to $11,385.56 for a 
general election and another 
$11,385.56 for a contested 
primary. Since 1995 Ohio has 
also offered a 100% tax credit of 
up to $50 per individual for 
contributions to candidates for 
state office.  While this would 
seem to be an incentive for low-
dollar contributors, the state does 
a poor job of educating citizens 
to the credit’s existence and it 
(remarkably) makes the credit 
available only to taxpayers who file the long income tax form.2  Most lower-income and 
many middle-income taxpayers use the short form for their state taxes. According to one 
study written in 2002, no more than one-half of one percent of the state’s tax filers has 
used the credit in any given year and there is little evidence that this particular credit, as 
implemented, has had a significant effect on small contributions.3  That number has 
increased in recent years.  In 2008, according to the Ohio State Department of Taxation, 
72,439 tax returns used the credit.  That still represents less than one percent of the state’s 
voting age population who used this opportunity to contribute “free money”. 
 
Given the state’s relatively high contribution limits, and the missed opportunity 
represented by the tax credit, the state’s donor profile was not very different from 
Illinois’ or Indiana’s.  In 2010, legislative and gubernatorial candidates received only 4% 
of their money from donors who gave $100 or less, and another 4% from those who gave 
$101-250.  In contrast, 36% of their money came from individual donors whose 
contributions aggregated to $1,000 or more, 29% from political parties and 22% from 
non-party interest groups. 
  
 
 
 ©2011 The Campaign Finance Institute                           CampaignFinanceInstitute.org                              PAGE 7 
 
Michigan 
 
In Michigan individuals are 
allowed to contribute $3,400 per 
election cycle to a statewide 
candidate, $1,000 to a candidate 
for the state Senate and $500 to a 
candidate for state 
representative.  All of these 
limits are below the national 
median of $4,000 for a 
gubernatorial candidate and 
$2,000 for state representative.   
In fact, Michigan's limit for state 
representative is tied for being 
the third lowest in the country. 
Michigan also places “political 
committees” under the same limits as individuals, but allows “independent committees” 
(equivalent to multi-candidate PACs) to contribute ten times as much.  For gubernatorial 
candidates, this put the PAC limit for 2010 at $34,000. 
 
Since 1976 Michigan has had a public financing system, for gubernatorial candidates 
only.  Under the Michigan system, participating candidates in a major-party primary 
receive $2 in matching fund funds for each of the first $100 in qualifying contributions 
per donor, up to a maximum of $990,000 per candidate.  Major party nominees are 
eligible for a grant of $1.125 million to spend in the general election.  In both elections, 
the public funds represent partial financing.  Candidates who accept public money 
supplement it with private funds, but must adhere to a spending limit of $2 million for the 
primary and another $2 million for the general election.  This limit has not been adjusted 
since 1993.  While the ceiling is waived if the participating candidate is running against a 
self-financed candidate, it is not waived under other conditions.  As a result, one recent 
monograph-length study referred to the program as “driving toward collapse.”4  Almost 
all candidates participated through 1994, but participation has declined since.  However, 
in both 2006 and 2010, a wealthy Republican nominee ran a high-spending and partly 
self-funded campaign, permitting opponents to accept the partial public financing while 
raising private funds without a spending limit.  
 
As with the previous three states, most of the money in Michigan comes from large 
donors, parties and interest groups.  In 2009-2010, 6% of the candidates’ money came 
from donors who gave $1-100 and another 6% from those who gave $101-250.  By 
comparison, 21% came from donors who gave $1,000 or more, 26% from political parties 
and 30% from PACs and other non-party organizations.     
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Wisconsin 
 
Wisconsin lets individuals give 
$10,000 to a candidate for 
statewide office over the course of 
an election cycle, $1,000 to a 
candidate for Senator and $500 
for an Assembly candidate.  
Individuals also may give only 
$10,000 per calendar year to all 
candidates, parties and political 
committees combined.  PACs may 
give only $1,000 to a state Senate 
candidate and $500 for state 
Representative but they can give 
up to $43,128 to a candidate for 
governor.  Thus, Wisconsin’s contribution limits are roughly the same as Michigan’s, 
even though the participation by small and large donors is different. 
 
Wisconsin had a system of partial financing for statewide and legislative candidates from 
1977 through 2011.  With Minnesota, it was one of only two states to have an effective 
program for legislative candidates in the 1970s, long before Maine's and Arizona's full 
public financing programs took effect in 2000. In 1986, however, Wisconsin's legislature 
removed the inflation adjustments for the program’s spending limits as well as its public 
grants.  As in Michigan, the value of participating eroded and most candidates opted out.  
By 1996, a gubernatorial commission found that the system was "simply not working"5.  
Only 26 candidates received public funding in 2008.6  As a result, the pubic financing 
system did not have a significant effect on the role of large and small donors in recent 
elections.  The state legislature and Governor effectively ended the program in June 
2011. 
 
In 2010, Wisconsin’s legislative and gubernatorial candidates received 19% of their 
privately raised money from donors who gave $1-100 and another 15% from donors who 
gave $101-250.  As noted earlier, Wisconsin was the state with the third highest 
percentage of candidate money coming from donors who gave $250 or less.  Even so, 
34% of the candidates’ funds came from donors who gave $1,000 or more.  Only 2% 
came from political parties and 9% from non-party PACs.  
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Minnesota 
 
Minnesota also has lower than 
average contribution limits for 
individuals: $3,500 per election 
cycle for gubernatorial 
candidates and $600 for 
legislative candidates.   
 
Minnesota provides partial 
public financing grants to 
candidates who agree to abide by 
a spending limit.  Because the 
program has been revised several 
times since its inception, it is still 
used by a significant number of 
candidates.  In 2010, 81% of the 
major party general election 
candidates for the House and 85% of those in the Senate participated in the system.  That 
was down by about ten percentage points from 2006, but 90% of the Democrats and 75% 
of the Republicans accept public funding with spending limits.  
 
Until 2009, the state also permitted donors to receive a rebate of up to $50 per year for 
contributions either to political parties or to candidates who were in the public financing 
system.  However, the Political Contribution Refund (PCR) system was suspended by 
Gov. Tim Pawlenty on July 1, 2009 as part of a broad executive action to balance the 
state's budget.    
 
In the 2010 election, Minnesota’s candidates received a nation-leading 44% of their 
privately raised funds from donors who gave $100 or less. Another 13% came from those 
who gave $101-$250.  These were only slightly below the percentages for 2006.  About 
14% of the candidates’ money in 2010 came from individuals who gave $1,000 or more 
(all to the gubernatorial candidates, given the state’s contribution limits), 8% from 
political parties and 10% from non-party PACs. 
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What If …? 
 
The next section of this report looks at what would happen to the mixture of donors in a 
state under a few different policy scenarios.  We present a separate set of four bar charts 
for each state, with an additional set for Wisconsin to reflect an actual proposal on the 
table.   
 
The first chart in each set repeats the state’s current donor profile, as shown in the figures 
above.   The second chart shows what would happen to that state’s donor profile if 
candidates’ contribution limits were lowered, with no other change in policy or donor 
participation.  The scenario assumes a maximum contribution of $2,000 from individuals, 
which would be at the national median for legislative candidates and about half the 
median for gubernatorial candidates.  It also assumes a $10,000 limit on contributions 
from PACs or other non-party organizations.  The figures underlying the chart were 
derived by beginning with the donors who actually gave in 2009-2010 and removing the 
money that would have exceeded the new limits.  In the real world, of course, some large 
donors might redistribute their funds to new candidates.  This chart therefore shows the 
maximum likely impact of the hypothetical limit. 
 
The next two charts show what would happen if the state implemented a public matching 
fund program that was targeted toward changing the incentives to make it more attractive 
for candidates to raise money from small donors.  The policy scenario assumes a program 
in which the state offers $5 for each of the first $50 that an individual donates, with no 
other change in public policy other than the contribution limits shown in the previous 
chart.  The scenario assumes that first $50 from all donors would be matched (even a 
donor who gives as much as the contribution limit).  Some proposals would match only 
the money from donors whose contributions aggregate to a small dollar figure, even 
though the state’s contribution limit allows donors to contribute more.  This is more 
difficult to model, because it would require candidates to return funds from donors who 
exceed the matching-fund limit.  We also were concerned substantively that an aggregate 
limit would have little impact on the proportional role of small donors, while creating a 
disincentive for participation from donors who want to come back during the heat of a 
campaign and give more than once.   
 
The numbers in the two public funding scenarios also assume that all general election 
candidates will participate.  This is obviously an unrealistic assumption, so these charts 
should also be seen as showing maximum likely impacts.  However, two points 
strengthen the estimates’ accuracy. (1) Since there are no spending limits assumed in 
these proposals, candidate participation would likely be high. (2) Even if some candidates 
opt out, the percentage distributions should be in the ranges shown for those who do 
choose to participate. 
 
The first of the two matching-fund charts (which is the third on each page) shows what 
would happen in the highly unlikely event that the matching funds brought no new 
donors into the system over and above the ones who gave in 2010.  Each chart places the 
value of all public matching money in the same bar as the donor who triggered the match.  
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Thus, the $250 triggered by a $50 donor is included in the $1-$100 bar, while the $250 
triggered by a $1,000 donor is including in the $1,000 bar.  
 
The second of the two matching-fund charts (and fourth chart on the page) shows what 
would happen if the program were successful in bringing new donors into the system.  To 
estimate the impact, we wanted to present a picture that ought to be attainable 
realistically.  As noted, 4% or more of the voting age population (VAP) in the top-four 
performing states contributed to gubernatorial and legislative candidates in 2006, with 
about half contributing to each set of offices.  These scenarios show what would happen 
if enough new people brought the donor-participation up to 4%, divided evenly between 
legislative and gubernatorial candidates.  For states with participation already above 1% 
for either set of offices, we simply assumed the program would add another percentage 
point for that office.  We further assumed that each new donor would give exactly $50, 
and that this would be matched five-to-one.  
 
The first of the public funding scenarios, with no new donors, almost surely is 
unrealistically pessimistic and the second (4% participation) is highly optimistic.  The 
most likely result for each state would fall somewhere between these two bar charts.   
 
It will be obvious from the scenarios that contribution limits are not the driving engine in 
changing the role of small donors.  They may be useful for helping small donors believe 
that their contributions are meaningful, but do not do much by themselves to alter the 
balance among donors. The limits are therefore justified primarily by their effects on 
corruption and the appearance of corruption.  By way of contrast, a matching fund 
incentive would have a direct and substantial impact, even if all donors are matched.  
This is obvious in every one of the Midwestern states in this report.  The reason is fairly 
obvious: even though most of money comes from large donors, most of the donors are 
small donors.  A multiple matching fund increases the importance of ones who already 
participate as well as creating an incentive for candidates to recruit more to join in. 
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Illinois … What if?  
 
In Illinois, imposing contribution limits on the top donors would bring the role of $1-
$150 donors up marginally, from 3% to 4% of total funds raised.  Adding a five-for-one 
small donor matching fund program with no new donors would bring that percentage 
only up to 14%, because so few small donors currently participate in that state. Even with 
such low participation, however, the matching fund would replace all of the money the 
candidates lose through contribution limits.  But if 4% of the people were to give $50 
each under a matching fund scenario, as they do in the high-participation states, the role 
of the $150-and-under donors would skyrocket to 62% of the total. 
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Indiana … What if? 
 
The Indiana picture is similar to the one in Illinois. Contribution limits alone would bring 
the role of $1-$100 donors up from 3% to 5% of total funds raised.  Because Indiana has 
a somewhat higher participation rate than Illinois, a five-for-one small donor matching 
fund program would bring the under-$100 percentage up to 18%.  But once again, 
bringing new donors into the system would produce dramatic results.  A five-for-one 
match with increased participation would bring the small donors’ percentage up to 64%.  
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Ohio … What if? 
 
Because Ohio already has a contribution limit, lowering the limits further would increase 
the role of small donors only from 4% to 5%.  Adding a five-for-one match, without any 
new donors, would bring the small donors’ proportional role up to 19%.  But as with the 
previous two states, increased participation would make those donors responsible for 
61% of the funds in the system. 
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Michigan … What if? 
 
In Michigan, lowering the contribution limits would increase the proportional role of 
small donors from 5.8% to 6.5%.  Adding a five-for-one match with no new donors 
would more than triple the importance of $100-and-under donors, to 21% of the total.  
Increased participation would push that all the way up to 72%.  
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Wisconsin … What if? 
 
In Wisconsin, which already has low contribution limits, the hypothetical limits in our 
scenario would increase the role of $100-and-under donors from 19% to 22%.  But 
because the state already has a high rate of participation by small donors, adding a 
matching fund to the existing donor pool would bring that percentage up to 46%.  And if 
participation were to increase further because of the new incentive, the small donors 
would account for 66% of the whole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ©2011 The Campaign Finance Institute                           CampaignFinanceInstitute.org                              PAGE 17 
 
Wisconsin Democracy Campaign’s Proposal 
 
The Wisconsin Democracy Campaign, a campaign reform organization based in 
Madison, introduced a proposal in 2011 that in many respects looks like the hypothetical 
small-donor matching fund scenario being described above.  However, the proposal has 
some unique wrinkles.  CFI therefore has prepared a set of graphs to project how this 
proposal would be likely to affect the role of small donors.  Under the proposal:  
• Contribution limits would be reduced from $10,000 to $1,000 for gubernatorial 
candidates and cut in half from their current levels for legislative candidates.  
(These contribution limits are all lower than the ones on our hypothetical 
scenarios.)  
• The state would offer four-to-one matching funds for donors whose contributions 
aggregated to $50 or less (instead of five-for-one under our hypothetical scenario) 
and three-for one for donors who aggregate to $51-$100 (instead of our zero for 
the dollars above $50). 
• If a donor gave more than $100, the public matching funds to a candidate would 
be reduced.  As a result, there would little incentive for a donor to give more than 
$100.  Our projections in the charts for this proposal assume that all donors who 
previously gave $500 or less would restrict their giving to $100 per candidate, 
since that would leave the candidate with $400 and the donors could increase their 
impact by spreading their money around to other candidates.  Donors who gave 
$500 or more were assumed to continue giving at their previous rate, subject to 
the proposal’s new contribution limits. 
• The proposal also would offer a $25 tax credit to individuals ($50 to couples) for 
small campaign contributions.  When combined with a matching fund, this would 
almost surely increase donor participation.  In effect, a donor who gave only $25 
would be triggering $125 for the candidate at no cost to the donor (adding the 
value of the tax credit to that of the four-for-one match). A $50 donor would be 
triggering $225 in public cost ($25 tax credit plus $200 in matching funds) in 
return for only $25 out of the donor’s own pocket. 
The Campaign Finance Institute estimates that this combination of policies would have 
extraordinarily powerful effects.  As in earlier examples, the contribution limits section 
alone would have only a modest impact, increasing the importance of $100-and-under 
donors from 19% to 26% of the total.  But adding a matching fund to the existing donor 
pool would have a huge impact, given the incentives built into the proposal.  Even with 
no new participants, small donors would increase their proportional role under this 
proposal to an impressively high 85%.  And combining the match with increased 
participation would bring the $100-and-under donors to an astounding 91% of the total.  
At the same time, the role of $1,000-or-more donors would be cut from the current 34% 
to 6%, while the role of PACs would shrink from 9% to only 1%. 
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Wisconsin Democracy Campaign’s Proposal 
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Partial Flat Grants versus Matching Funds – Minnesota Hypothetical: 
Public Financing in the Wake of the Arizona Free Enterprise decision 
 
As noted earlier, Minnesota already has a partial public financing system used by a large 
majority of the general election candidates from both major political parties.  Small 
donors fuel a much higher proportion of Minnesota’s private contributions than any other 
state in the nation.   Nevertheless, there is at least some possibility that the state’s public 
financing system could become subject to problems within a few years.  That could 
happen if independent spending or self-financing increases, as it has elsewhere, and if 
candidates consider spending limits too risky in such an environment.  In either of these 
situations, spending ceilings can become a trap for public funding participants.  Some 
states tried to respond by offering extra public funds to candidates who face high 
spending opponents or independent spending , but the Supreme Court held such a 
provision to be unconstitutional in Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett (June 2011).  
 
By saying that states may not respond to high spending non-participants or independent 
spending with trigger funds, the Court’s decision is likely to make candidates feel 
uncomfortable with spending limits.  Public financing will then deteriorate over time as 
candidates opt out.  This is what happened to the federal presidential system as well as to 
the system in Wisconsin.  While Minnesota’s system is still used by most candidates 
from both major political parties, there was a ten percentage point drop in usage between 
2006 and 2010.  
 
In this situation, supporters of public financing might prefer to shift to a system that does 
the following:  (1) maintains current contribution limits; (2) replaces the current partial 
grant system with multiple matching funds; (3) puts a maximum on the amount of public 
money a candidate may receive in matching funds; and (4) lets candidates continue to 
raise funds without limit, as long as the funds come from small contributions.  Such a 
system would be similar to one being considered in several states.   
 
The following charts show that if a multiple-matching fund system were adopted, 
Minnesota’s candidates would continue to raise the bulk of their private funds from small 
donors and the matching funds would more than replace the lost grants.  The first chart 
shows where the funds actually came from in 2009-2010, when candidates raised 44% of 
their private money from donors who gave them $100 or less.  If the flat grant were 
replaced by a matching fund, the new system would easily replace the lost money and 
then some.   
 
According to the National Institute of Money in State Politics, the public subsidy to 
candidates amounted to about $4.5 million in 2010 and $4.7 million in 2006. Providing a 
five-for-one match for each donor’s first $50 would generate more than $28 million in 
public matching money, even if no new donors came into the system.  It would generate 
$53 million with new donors.  At these levels, the under-$100 donors would be 
responsible for 77%-87% of the candidates’ money.   Of course, Minnesotans might balk 
at expenditures above current levels.  In that case, public spending could be controlled by 
limiting the maximum subsidy per candidate, rather than candidates’ spending.   
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A matching fund system may not be the mechanism of first choice for Minnesotans 
today, but it is one that responds to the constitutionally permitted scenarios of the future.  
With corporations able to spend unlimited amounts independently, candidates will find it 
increasingly difficult to participate in the old system.  These charts show that multiple 
matching funds can be a powerful lever for creating a new one in which Minnesota – or 
any other state – can replicate Minnesota’s current first-in-the-nation performance for 
small donor fundraising.  
 
Minnesota with a Matching Fund Program 
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Conclusion 
 
For several decades, campaign finance debates have been polarized between the 
advocates of a laissez-faire market that will naturally be dominated by wealthy donors, 
versus those who would respond to the power of wealth through restrictions.  This report 
shows there to be another path.  The system can be transformed through positive 
incentives designed to foster participation by small donors.  The wealthy and powerful 
will continue to be heard, but there will be alternatives.  Small donors will be asked to 
give and to volunteer because candidates will have an incentive to do so. Citizens will 
respond because they will know that their voices will matter.   
 
Two objections will be raised to such an approach.  The first will be based on a healthy 
skepticism about whether the hypotheticals will work in practice.  In response: the 
scenarios presented here build on initiatives that in fact exist elsewhere.  Matching funds 
have worked as effective incentives in a host of fundraising venues outside of politics.  
Within campaign finance, the scenarios in this report closely resemble the six-for-one 
small-donor matching fund system in place for municipal elections in the City of New 
York.  The Campaign Finance Institute’s previously published research has shown the 
New York City system to be highly effective.7  The system is simple, and it works.  
 
A second objection will come from those who simply oppose any form of public 
financing.  To this objection, we would note that under a matching fund system, no public 
money would go to a candidate unless it matches money from a donor who puts “skin in 
the game.”  Rather than a so-called program of “welfare for politicians”, the matching 
format is more accurately described as “empowerment for citizens”.  The debate will turn 
on a question of principle.  Is such empowerment an appropriate use of public funds?   
The argument in favor of matching funds is that citizen engagement is a public good.  It 
is not constitutionally acceptable to promote this good through restrictions on speech, but 
it is permissible and we believe appropriate to use public resources promote it 
affirmatively.  Of course this will not be easy to sell politically.  This report is not meant 
to address the issue’s politics.  But it does show that such an approach, if adopted, would 
be likely to have a very strong substantive impact.   
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